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DECODING THE “SPHINX-LIKE SILENCE”:  
STATE RESIDENCY, PETITION CIRCULATION, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Ryan A. Partelow* 
 
State governments are the primary regulators of elections and ballot 
access in the United States.  State statutes determine who is eligible to be on 
the ballot in each particular state, as well as who may assist these individuals 
by gathering petition signatures.  Candidates for political office, initiative 
proponents, and their supporters have challenged some of these restrictions 
as unconstitutional burdens on political speech.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
had great difficulty in articulating a coherent standard of review in this area 
of the law, which shows that the line between a state’s reasonable regulation 
of the election process and an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment 
rights is not easy to define. 
One particular area where this issue has come into focus is state laws 
requiring petition circulators to be state residents or, alternatively, eligible 
to vote in the state.  The majority of circuits have declared these restrictions 
unconstitutional burdens on political speech, while one circuit has found 
them a reasonable regulation of a state’s electoral process.  This Note 
explores the history and context of the Supreme Court’s struggle to establish 
a consistent standard of review in ballot-access cases before examining the 
nuances of the constitutionality of both residency and voter eligibility 
requirements.  This Note ultimately argues that the minority view is the more 
correct reading of Supreme Court precedent and that residency requirements 
are generally reasonable state regulations of elections, while voter eligibility 
requirements are unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In spring 2016, the Libertarian Party of New York nominated Alex Merced 
as its candidate for U.S. Senate.1  A marketing executive and longtime 
libertarian activist and blogger, Merced kicked off his Senate campaign by 
speaking at the Libertarian Party’s national convention in Orlando, Florida, 
where Gary Johnson accepted the party’s nomination for President of the 
 
 1. Complaint para. 17, Merced v. Spano, No. 16CV3054 (SJ) (SMG), 2016 WL 3906646, 
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2016). 
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United States.2  At the time of his speech to the convention, however, Merced 
and his supporters were unsure whether he would qualify to appear on New 
York’s ballot for the November general election.3 
New York’s ballot-access laws have historically been criticized as some of 
the most stringent and complicated in the country.4  In addition to requiring 
candidates in Merced’s position to collect 15,000 signatures of registered 
New York voters within a period of six weeks, each signature must be 
witnessed by an individual who is either a “duly qualified voter” in New 
York, a New York Notary Public, or a New York Commissioner of Deeds.5  
As such, although activists living outside of New York wished to help 
Merced appear on the ballot, they were forbidden from acting as witnesses in 
New York’s petitioning process.6 
On June 13, a little over a week before the beginning of the petitioning 
period, Merced and other Libertarians filed a lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of New York’s “duly qualified voter” and state-residency 
requirements for petition witnesses.7  Seeking a preliminary injunction, 
Merced alleged that these provisions in New York election law put third 
parties and independent organizations, such as the Libertarian Party of New 
York, at a severe disadvantage in accessing the ballot.8  Furthermore, Merced 
maintained that the restrictions constituted a “severe burden” on political 
speech rights under the First Amendment because the requirements made it 
more difficult for Merced and his supporters to disseminate their political 
views.9 
The State of New York contended that the restrictions were necessary to 
advance its interest in limiting petition witnesses to state residents, which 
would ensure that all witnesses would be answerable to New York courts.10  
New York further argued the restrictions “serve[] the compelling interest of 
 
 2. Libertarian Party National Convention, Day 2 Part 1, C-SPAN (May 29, 2016), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?409917-1/libertarian-party-selects-gary-johnson-2016-
nominee [https://perma.cc/AM3X-CQ4P] (statement of Alex Merced at timestamp 2:44:50).  
 3. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 17–18, 35. 
 4. See, e.g., Katherine E. Schuelke, Note, A Call for Reform of New York State’s Ballot 
Access Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182, 182 (1989); DeNora Getachew & Andrea Senteno, 
Understanding the Labyrinth:  New York’s Ballot Access Laws, GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 29, 
2009), http://www.gothamgazette.com/open-government/252-understanding-the-labyrinth-
new-yorks-ballot-access-laws [https://perma.cc/4TVC-4TAE]; Michael Specter, Once Again, 
New York’s Arcane Election Laws Shape Race, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/28/nyregion/once-again-new-york-s-arcane-election-laws-
shape-race.html [https://perma.cc/H8F7-2AD8].  But see JERRY GOLDFEDER, GOLDFEDER’S 
MODERN ELECTION LAW:  BALLOT ACCESS IN NEW YORK 1 (2012) (noting that New York’s 
ballot-access laws “have become more liberalized in the last few years, and are fairly 
straightforward”). 
 5. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-140 (McKinney 2017). 
 6. Complaint, supra note 1, paras. 17–18. 
 7. Id. paras. 14–25. 
 8. Id. paras. 25–26, 31–34. 
 9. Id. para. 34. 
 10. Merced v. Spano, No. 16CV3054 (SJ) (SMG), 2016 WL 3906646, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 14, 2016). 
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preventing those who do not have the right to vote from serving as witnesses” 
in the election process.11 
The court, noting that the Libertarian Party had filed petitions in 
accordance with the law without complaint every two years since 1974, 
denied Merced’s request for a preliminary injunction in July 2016.12  The 
court simultaneously held, however, that Merced was likely to succeed on 
the merits of his claim, and the suit is currently moving forward.13 
Like all actions challenging ballot-access restrictions in the United States, 
Merced’s suit asks the court to weigh two fundamental principles of federal 
republican government—states’ regulation of their own electoral systems 
and individual constitutional rights to political speech and assembly.  Since 
the turn of the millennium, similar suits have challenged residency or voter 
eligibility requirements for petition circulators across the United States.14 
The issue of whether residency and voter eligibility requirements for 
petition circulators violate the First Amendment currently divides circuit 
courts.15  This Note offers a way forward and weighs the constitutional 
arguments on both sides and the profound policy implications of this 
question. 
Part I of this Note examines the background, legal context, and history of 
residency and voter eligibility requirements for petition circulators.  Next, 
Part II discusses the split among circuit courts on whether residency and voter 
eligibility requirements violate the First Amendment.  Part III then argues 
that the majority view fundamentally misreads Supreme Court precedents 
and creates the potential for even reasonable restrictions to be held 
unconstitutional.  This Note advocates for a more flexible standard in 
evaluating restrictions on petition circulation.  While each individual state 
statute presents a unique set of circumstances that must be carefully 
considered, state-residency requirements for petition circulators should 
generally be upheld as constitutional, while voter registration and eligibility 
requirements should not. 
I.  BALLOT-ACCESS, PETITION-CIRCULATION, 
AND RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 
Before examining the constitutionality of residency and voter eligibility 
requirements, it is necessary to place the question in the proper context.  Part 
I.A provides a brief overview of the general framework of election law in the 
United States.  This includes variations in procedures for securing a place on 
the ballot for both ballot initiatives and candidates for political office.  Part 
I.B discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s complex and often confusing 
standards for analyzing ballot-access cases under the First Amendment, 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(discussing the holdings of numerous cases challenging similar restrictions). 
 15. See id. at 442–43 (noting the split between the Eighth and Tenth Circuits on the 
constitutionality of residency requirements). 
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including relevant precedents that frame the current circuit split over 
residency and voter eligibility requirements.  Part I.C describes the 
challenges legislatures and courts face as they attempt to administer elections 
in the twenty-first century. 
A.  Election Law in America:  The States’ Playground 
The U.S. Constitution grants state legislatures direct control in the first 
instance over “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.”16  As 
such, election law in the United States is an assortment of rules and standards 
that vary across state lines.17  State legislatures not only regulate their own 
state elections but also federal elections within the state, subject to certain 
constitutional and statutory constraints.18 
The framers of the Constitution believed that state oversight of elections 
would be “both more convenient and more satisfactory” than direct federal 
control.19  At the time of ratification, opponents of an overbearing federal 
government feared that direct federal control over elections could lead to 
undue influence and favoritism for one group of people nationwide, such as 
“the wealthy and the well-born.”20  In granting states authority over their own 
electoral affairs in the Constitution, the framers reasoned that “diversity 
in . . . the people of the different parts of the Union, [would] occasion a 
material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different 
ranks and conditions in society.”21 
The framers recognized the potential for hostile foreign powers to meddle 
in the young republic’s electoral system.22  While the framers did not 
explicitly tie this concern to the decision to have state governments oversee 
federal elections, concerns about foreign influence permeated the debate on 
the Constitution.23 
 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § IV. 
 17. See Eli Watkins, How to Register to Vote in Every US State and Territory, CNN (Oct. 
12, 2016, 11:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/14/politics/how-to-register-to-vote-in-
every-us-state-and-territory/index.html [https://perma.cc/QW5W-N9PU]. 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § IV (“[T]he Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such [election] Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”); see also infra Part 
I.B (describing the Court’s ballot-access jurisprudence). 
 19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 
2009). 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 
2009); see also J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 530–31 (1966) (“[James] Madison anticipated the division of the country 
into conflicting and competing economic and professional interests, and maintained that the 
chief cause of conflict would be between those with and those without property.”). 
 21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 
2009). 
 22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 
2009) (warning of the desire of “deadly adversaries of republican government . . . [and] foreign 
powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils”). 
 23. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2, 3 (John Jay), NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton); see 
also JAMES MADISON, Notes of Monday, August 13, in THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
384, 384 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920) (noting Massachusetts delegate 
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Ultimately, in giving state governments power over federal elections, the 
framers fundamentally believed that state legislatures were the closest 
government body to the people.  Thus, state legislatures would likely be the 
easiest to hold accountable should the people feel that the legislature was 
failing to uphold their interests or attempting to subjugate the people’s voice 
through unfair election laws.24 
A century after the Constitution’s ratification, state-level populist and 
progressive reformers made such a push to hold state governments 
accountable.  These activists proposed a way for the people to bypass 
legislatures that had become beholden to special interest groups and refused 
to pass laws that were favored by a majority of state residents.25  As a result, 
many states enacted ballot-initiative laws that allowed voters to directly place 
legislative propositions on a referendum ballot for approval by popular 
vote.26  Drawing influence from Switzerland’s constitution, Athenian 
democracy, and the New England “town meeting,” the initiative process 
aimed to give legislative and political power directly to the electorate, which 
served as a bulwark against corrosive corruption and intransigence in state 
legislatures.27 
The initiative process represented a monumental shift that continues to 
play a major role in modern politics.  Fourteen states allow voters to directly 
legislate via the ballot initiative, sixteen allow the enactment of constitutional 
amendments via the initiative, and twenty-four states have a process known 
as a “popular referendum” whereby voters may affirm or reject a law passed 
by the legislature.28 
For an initiative question to be approved by the state’s voters, its 
proponents must first secure it a place on the ballot.  States ordinarily require 
that proponents circulate petitions, a process of collecting a statutorily 
 
Elbridge Gerry’s fear, shared by many influential delegates, that “[f]oreign powers will 
intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no expence to influence them” and that “[p]ersons having 
foreign attachments will be sent among us & insinuated into our councils, in order to be made 
i[n]struments for their purposes”).  For a more thorough analysis of the framers’ fears of 
foreign influence in the years preceding and immediately following the Constitution’s 
ratification, see Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial Electioneering and the Globalization of 
American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 162, 168–70 (2009). 
 24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 60 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 46, 
at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he prepossessions of the people, on 
whom both [federal and state governments] will depend, will be more on the side of the State 
governments, than of the federal government.”). 
 25. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE:  CITIZEN LAWMAKING 1–3 (2d ed. 2014). 
 26. See id. at 1. 
 27. See id. at 4. 
 28. For a chart of which states allow which processes, see Initiative and Referendum 
States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/9WUB-BPFZ] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2018).  The described methods of initiative and referendum are not mutually 
exclusive, and several states allow for multiple methods. Id.  Missouri, for example, allows 
constitutional amendments and statutory law to be enacted via the initiative, as well as popular 
referendum of statutes approved by the legislature. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 116.030–.040 
(2014). 
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mandated number of registered voters’ signatures.29  Although not used 
exclusively, states often require petitioning as a prerequisite for ballot access 
for both ballot initiatives and candidates for political office.30 
The number of required signatures for any given petition can vary greatly 
depending on the state, type of petition, and, where applicable, the office 
sought by a particular candidate.31  Requirements can also differ depending 
on whether a candidate seeks the nomination of a political party or plans to 
run as an independent.32  These signature requirements theoretically ensure 
that the candidate or initiative has “some preliminary showing of a significant 
modicum of support” among the state’s voters before being placed on the 
ballot.33  States contend that without these requirements, frivolous candidates 
and measures with no real popular appeal could clutter the ballot and lead to 
voter confusion and difficulty in administering the democratic process.34 
States place many restrictions on the petitioning process, including limits 
on who is eligible and qualified to physically collect the required signatures, 
a position commonly known as a “petition circulator.”35  Restrictions on 
circulator eligibility can vary in scope and language.36 
 
 29. See Laws Governing Petition Circulators, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/laws-governing-petition-
circulators.aspx [https://perma.cc/7LQB-9YHQ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 30. See MICHAEL DIMINO ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 678 (2d ed. 2015).  
New Hampshire, for example, gives party candidates for state offices the choice of collecting 
individual forms to be filled out by registered voters, or paying a modest fee, ranging from $2 
to $100, depending on the office sought. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:19-c (2016). 
 31. See COSTAS PANAGOPOULOS & AARON C. WEINSCHENK, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO U.S. 
ELECTIONS:  EMPOWERING DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 97 (2016). 
 32. Compare, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-136(2)(g) (McKinney 2017) (requiring candidates 
seeking a party nomination for a congressional seat to collect 1250 signatures), with id. § 6-
142(2)(e) (requiring independent candidates running for the same elected office to collect 3500 
signatures). 
 33. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); see also JAMES A. GARDNER, WHAT 
ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR?:  THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN ELECTORAL LAW AND POLITICS 50 (2009).  
But see JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY:  THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 110 (2003) (arguing that the petition requirement does not promote the 
state’s interest in requiring a “modicum of support” because “[i]n every state it is clear that 
the voter’s signature does not express political support for the candidate”). 
 34. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1986); Jenness, 403 
U.S. at 442. 
 35. See Petition Circulator, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Petition_circulator 
[https://perma.cc/99KR-YLK5] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  States may also refer to 
circulators as “witnesses” when the law requires them to submit an affidavit verifying their 
collected signatures. See, e.g., Running for Office, N.Y. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS, 
https://www.elections.ny.gov/RunningOffice.html [https://perma.cc/EB38-3XRY] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 36. The restrictions this Note analyzes frequently occur alongside other limitations on the 
petitioning process.  For example, scholarship has focused on state restrictions on payments 
to petition circulators. See, e.g., Jessica A. Levinson, Taking the Initiative:  How to Save Direct 
Democracy, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019, 1022, 1061 (2014) (arguing that states should 
have the constitutional power to prohibit payments to circulators); Jennifer S. Senior, 
Comment, Expanding the Court’s First Amendment Accessibility Framework for Analyzing 
Ballot Initiative Circulator Regulations, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529, 536–37 (discussing the 
effects of payment restrictions on different types of interest groups). 
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Some states have imposed requirements that circulators be “residents” of 
the state.37  Other states mandate that circulators be eligible voters or 
“qualified electors.”38  This ordinarily means that circulators must be U.S. 
citizens, legal residents of the state,39 and must not have some other 
restriction preventing them from exercising their right to vote, such as a 
felony conviction in certain states.40  A voter eligibility requirement usually 
allows a qualified person to circulate petitions even if they are not registered 
to vote.41  In states that do not have requirements outside of residency, age, 
and U.S. citizenship, however, a voter eligibility requirement can effectively 
function as a residency requirement.42 
States have put forward various justifications for these and other similar 
ballot-access restrictions.  The Supreme Court has recognized asserted state 
interests in protecting election integrity,43 preventing fraud in the election 
process,44 and ensuring that circulators are answerable to the subpoena power 
of the state’s courts.45  The Court has also been sympathetic to a state’s 
interest in protecting political stability.46  Other justifications include 
ensuring that candidates and ballot-initiative questions have sufficient 
grassroots support in the community before being placed on the ballot to 
avoid a cluttered and confusing ballot that prevents voters from making 
informed choices.47  Courts have not always found these interests justified, 
 
 37. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.105 (2016) (requiring an initiative-petition circulator 
to be a citizen of the United States, at least eighteen years of age, and “a resident of the state”); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1807 (West 2017) (requiring initiative-petition circulators to be 
“resident[s] of the state of Idaho and at least eighteen (18) years of age”).  Although the Ninth 
Circuit held Arizona’s residency requirement for candidate-nominating petitions 
unconstitutional, the application of that holding to these Alaska and Idaho statutes is not yet 
clear. See Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 38. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-01-09 (West 2017) (requiring a circulator to 
certify her status as a “qualified elector”). 
 39. Not all voter-eligibility requirements require in-state residency.  Kansas only requires 
that candidate-petition circulators satisfy the constitutional requirements for voter eligibility 
in the United States and not have been convicted of a felony. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3608 
(2017). 
 40. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/J8E9-A4T3] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 41. See, e.g., N.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2017–2019 INITIATING AND REFERRING LAW IN NORTH 
DAKOTA 11 (2017), https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/portals/initiating.pdf [https://perma.cc/F48Q-
53SK].  But see GOLDFEDER, supra note 4, at 21, 38 (noting that the language of New York’s 
eligibility requirement, which requires a petition witness to be a “duly enrolled voter,” means 
that the witness must in fact be registered to vote in New York). 
 42. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-01-04 (2017) (stating that to qualify as an 
elector, an individual must be a U.S. citizen, eighteen years of age or older, and a resident of 
North Dakota who has resided in the precinct for at least thirty days prior to an election); see 
also Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614, 615–16 (8th Cir. 2001).  
 43. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997). 
 44. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam). 
 45. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. 525 U.S. 182, 196 (1999). 
 46. See, e.g., Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366–67. 
 47. See id. at 364; Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194–96 (1986). 
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or even legitimate, in instances when the restrictions unduly impose on 
individual constitutional rights.48 
B.  Constitutional Restraints on State Election Law:  
Dissecting the Chaos of the Court’s 
Ballot-Access Standard of Review 
While a state’s ability to regulate elections and ballot access is subject to 
constitutional constraints, courts, practitioners, and scholars have struggled 
to find consistency in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Part I.B.1 
discusses the evolution of the Court’s framework for ballot-access cases and 
their complex and often conflicting standards of review.  Part I.B.2 then 
outlines Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.,49 the 
landmark decision through which circuit courts have evaluated the 
constitutionality of residency and voter eligibility requirements. 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Ballot-Access Framework:  
A Sisyphean Effort to Develop a Consistent Standard of Review 
While the cases in the Supreme Court’s ballot-access framework are 
marked by inconsistent and contradictory standards of review, it is essential 
to have a firm grasp on the evolution of these precedents before applying 
them as they are crucial to determining the constitutionality of residency and 
voter eligibility requirements for petition circulators.50 
Evaluating the constitutionality of a state ballot-access restriction requires 
weighing the state’s asserted interest in enacting the restriction against the 
First Amendment rights to political speech and assembly.51  Within the 
confines of these rights, states play an important role in regulating elections. 
As the Court noted in Storer v. Brown,52 “as a practical matter, there must be 
a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if 
some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.”53 
In weighing these competing state and individual interests, however, the 
Court has been astonishingly inconsistent in what it considers the appropriate 
 
 48. See infra notes 177–78, 182–84, 203–12 and accompanying text (analyzing circuit 
court discussions of whether a state’s interest is compelling in the context of ballot-access 
restrictions). 
 49. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 50. For a more detailed and nuanced examination of the Court’s ballot-access 
jurisprudence, see Daniel S. Young, Comment, Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, Inc.:  The Struggle to Establish a Consistent Standard of Review in Ballot Access 
Cases Continues, 77 DENV. L. REV. 197 (1999); see also Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and 
the Ballot Box:  Supreme Court Jurisprudence and Ballot Access for Independent Candidates, 
7 BYU J. PUB. L. 281, 281–308 (1992). 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”).  The First Amendment applies 
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 52. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
 53. Id. at 730; see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 
(1997); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). 
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standard of review.54  Legal scholars and political scientists have written at 
length about how this inconsistency has led to unpredictability in the Court’s 
jurisprudence over time.55 
In its earliest ballot-access cases, the Court applied a form of tiered 
scrutiny derived from equal protection case law.56  In these cases, the Court 
often weighed ballot-access restrictions as violations of both First 
Amendment protections and equal protection rights.57  The Court’s holdings, 
even in these early decisions, were unpredictable.  They waffled between the 
applicable tiers of scrutiny even when dealing with strikingly similar ballot-
access restrictions.58  Some commentators have suggested that the 
inconsistent application of three-tiered scrutiny in these early cases might be 
due to the Justices’ desire to reach the right result in their holdings.59  This 
 
 54. See infra notes 58, 67. 
 55. See, e.g., Terry Smith, Election Law:  Election Laws and First Amendment 
Freedoms—Confusion and Clarification by the Supreme Court, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 597, 
610 (describing the Court’s standard of review in terms of “confusion and unpredictability”); 
Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights:  Third Parties Need Not 
Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 187 (1991) (labeling the Court’s ballot-access jurisprudence 
as “erratic”).  But see Porto, supra note 50, at 282, 284 (recognizing that, while the Court has 
“left in doubt the appropriate standard of review,” the “ballot access decisions have been 
substantially more consistent . . . than political scientists and legal commentators have 
recognized”). 
 56. The traditional three tiers of scrutiny are “strict scrutiny,” where a state must 
demonstrate that the contested regulation is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, 
“intermediate scrutiny,” where the state must demonstrate that the provision is substantially 
related to an important state interest, and “rational basis,” meaning the regulation must be 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 565–68 (5th ed. 2015). 
 57. The Equal Protection Clause provides. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  In these cases, 
the Court would usually hold a restriction to be both a violation of First Amendment freedoms 
and the Equal Protection Clause but occasionally entertained challenges based on equal 
protection alone, without mentioning the First Amendment implications. Compare Jenness v. 
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439–440 (1971) (declining to find a violation of either the First 
Amendment or equal protection), and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–34 (1968) 
(discussing the challenged restriction in terms of both First Amendment rights and equal 
protection), with Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (finding an equal protection 
violation without reference to the First Amendment). 
 58. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736–37 (1974) (upholding a California 
statute requiring independent candidates to collect signatures of at least 5 percent of the voters 
in the previous general election in order to appear on the ballot using the “compelling state 
interest” language of strict scrutiny review, but making no reference to whether the contested 
restrictions were narrowly tailored to support that interest); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145–47 (using 
the language of the rational basis test but seeming to apply a form of intermediate scrutiny to 
a Texas law requiring candidates to pay a large filing fee); Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438–40 
(applying rational basis review to a Georgia regulation requiring independent candidates to 
collect signatures of a minimum of 5 percent of registered voters in order to appear on the 
ballot); Williams, 393 U.S. at 25, 31 (applying strict scrutiny to an Ohio statute requiring third 
parties “to obtain petitions signed by qualified electors totaling 15% of the number of ballots 
cast in the last preceding gubernatorial election”). 
 59. See Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 143, 169 (2008) (“Perhaps the Court is not seeking to achieve consistency . . . .  
Perhaps the Justices believe that election law cases simply fall on a continuum that, for 
whatever reason, forecloses consistency between decisions.”); Young, supra note 50, at 212 
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results-oriented approach, however, ultimately came at the expense of a 
predictable and consistent framework through which to weigh the 
constitutional implications of ballot-access restrictions.60 
The Court seemingly tried to remedy this inconsistency in the early 1980s.  
The Justices began to depart from a rigid application of three-tiered scrutiny 
and instead applied a more ad hoc “balancing” or “sliding scale” test, best 
exemplified by Anderson v. Celebrezze.61  This approach arose from the 
Court’s assertion, beginning in the mid-1970s, that courts could not rigidly 
apply a one-size-fits-all “litmus-paper” test to decide whether a ballot-access 
restriction was constitutionally permissible.62  Instead, the Court needed a 
more tailored balancing of the conflicting state and individual interests.63 
The Anderson balancing test involves “an analytical process that parallels 
[the Court’s] work in ordinary litigation” by considering “the character and 
magnitude” of the burden on the plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.64  The Court then weighs this burden against “the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”65  
A tribunal “must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each . . . 
interest[], it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”66 
From the late 1980s to the present, the Court has appeared to synthesize 
the Anderson balancing approach with the tiered-scrutiny approach but has 
lacked consistency in its application.67  In cases where the Court finds that a 
restriction imposes a severe burden on core political speech, for instance, it 
will generally apply either the traditional strict scrutiny test68 or a standard it 
refers to as “exacting” scrutiny.69 
 
(“In [these] cases, the Court achieved the correct result, yet it did so at the expense of a 
consistent approach.”). 
 60. See Young, supra note 50, at 212. 
 61. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 62. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. 
 63. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be 
Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 283, 
295 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002) (“[Anderson] calls for judges to consider all of the 
factors that bear on a particular problem, giving each due weight under the particular 
circumstances.”); see also Brian Boyd, Comment, Stepping over What Towers to the Sky:  The 
Role of Animus Review in Election Law, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 495, 504–05 (2016) (discussing 
the question of the “relative weight of burdens and interests” inherent in Anderson). 
 64. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Compare, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992) (relying heavily on the 
traditional strict scrutiny language in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers 
Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979), while only briefly mentioning the balancing precedents from 
Anderson), with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 438 (1992) (relying almost 
exclusively on the Anderson balancing/sliding scale precedents while noting that regulations 
placing “severe” restrictions on First Amendment rights would need to be “narrowly drawn to 
advance a state interest of compelling importance” (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289)). 
 68. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002); see also DIMINO 
ET AL., supra note 30, at 533 (“‘Severe’ restrictions are subjected to strict scrutiny.”). 
 69. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); Meyer v. Grant, 
486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988). 
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Exacting scrutiny is another ambiguous and confusing term with an 
imprecise meaning that varies with the circumstances in which it is applied.70  
One view of exacting scrutiny understands it to require a state to demonstrate 
that the challenged law involves a substantial relationship to an important 
government interest—arguably a mere synonym for intermediate scrutiny.71  
The Court itself has previously conflated intermediate and exacting scrutiny, 
most notably in campaign-finance jurisprudence.72 
In other cases, the Court has defined exacting scrutiny using language 
more in line with a traditional strict scrutiny test.73  This has led some courts, 
and even some Supreme Court Justices, to use the terms “strict” and 
“exacting” interchangeably.74 
Professor R. George Wright has attempted to make sense of the apparent 
disparate uses of exacting scrutiny.75  He proposes that the Court 
intentionally uses the phrase as a broader term of art, which allows the 
Justices more flexibility in balancing state and individual interests.76  
Through this framework, the Justices can avoid tipping the balance to favor 
one outcome over another, as frequently alleged in cases involving a rigid 
tiered-scrutiny framework.77 
Regardless of whether the Court uses “exacting” or “strict” scrutiny 
terminology, if a state’s restriction creates a “severe” burden on core political 
 
 70. See R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REV. 207, 210 
(2016) (“[B]asic confusions and ambiguities regarding exacting scrutiny have already 
developed.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(applying exacting scrutiny to find that a restriction was “substantially related to [a] recognized 
governmental interest”); Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 
2012) (“[A]n intermediate level of scrutiny known as ‘exacting scrutiny’ is the appropriate 
standard.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 64, 94 (1976) (per curiam). 
 73. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (stating that a regulation 
will only survive exacting scrutiny if it “promotes a compelling interest and is the least 
restrictive means to further the articulated interest”); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (“[W]e apply 
‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an 
overriding state interest.”). 
 74. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 215 (1999) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing an opinion applying 
“exacting” scrutiny as applying “strict” scrutiny (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 
(1988)); see also Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 475 (6th Cir. 2008) (using an opinion 
applying “strict scrutiny” as an example of “exacting scrutiny”(citing Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., 525 U.S. at 210–11 (Thomas, J., concurring))); Bernbeck v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1114, 
1116 (8th Cir. 1997) (referencing “[t]he strict or exacting scrutiny standard”). 
 75. See generally Wright, supra note 70. 
 76. See id. at 214 (“Exacting scrutiny offers the flexibility, in light of the stakes and 
circumstances, of a broad and genuinely multi-dimensional sliding scale test . . . whose 
extremes can extend . . . beyond the limits set by both strict scrutiny on one end and typical 
forms of minimum scrutiny on the other.”). 
 77. See id. at 214 n.45; see also Randy Elf, The Constitutionality of State Law Triggering 
Burdens on Political Speech and the Current Circuit Splits, 29 REGENT U. L. REV. 35, 79 
(2016) (noting that “strict scrutiny buttons down the holding more tightly” than exacting 
scrutiny); Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
413, 419–20 (2012) (“[U]nlike [strict scrutiny and rational basis review], ‘exacting scrutiny’ 
does not put a thumb on either side of the constitutional scale.”). 
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speech, the hurdle the state must overcome is “well-nigh insurmountable” 
because protection of First Amendment rights in this instance is “at its 
zenith.”78  Conversely, in cases involving lesser burdens on speech rights, the 
Court has acknowledged that a less stringent review is merited, which means 
that the state’s regulatory interest will usually suffice to find the restriction 
permissible.79 
The Court used the “exacting” scrutiny language in a foundational case 
involving petition circulation, the unanimous decision Meyer v. Grant.80  
Grant was significant in holding that petition circulation constitutes “core 
political speech” because it comprises “interactive communication 
concerning political change.”81  The challenged Colorado law prohibited all 
forms of payment to ballot-initiative petition circulators.82  The Court found 
that the law had the effect of “reducing the total quantum of speech on a 
public issue” by limiting the number of voices who could convey a political 
message, and thus limiting the size of the audience those voices could reach 
with that message.83  Additionally, the law made it less likely that the 
initiative proponents could obtain the number of signatures necessary to place 
their issue on the ballot, thus “limiting their ability to make the matter the 
focus of statewide discussion.”84  Because the inability to pay circulators 
made circulation much more challenging, the Court found that the restriction 
severely burdened the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, which merited 
“exacting” scrutiny.85 
The Court did not rely on language from any traditional form of tiered 
scrutiny in its application of the “exacting” scrutiny standard.  Rather, the 
Court stated that it was not convinced by Colorado’s argument that the 
restriction was “justified by its interest” in ensuring ballot proposals had 
“sufficient grass roots support” or by the argument that the law was necessary 
to ensure the integrity of the local balloting process.86  Similarly, the Court 
found that contrary to Colorado’s assertions, there was no evidence that 
paying petition circulators induced those circulators to commit fraud and that 
Colorado already had less restrictive ways to address each of these interests.87 
The Court did not explicitly state how lower courts could replicate this 
application of “exacting” scrutiny.  Rather, the Court asserted that because 
Colorado had failed to justify the burden on the plaintiffs’ rights, the payment 
prohibition was a clear violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.88 
 
 78. Grant, 486 U.S. at 425 (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1456–57 (10th Cir. 
1987), aff’d, 486 U.S. 414). 
 79. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 80. 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
 81. Id. at 422. 
 82. See id. at 417. 
 83. Id. at 422–23. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 420, 423–25.  
 86. Id. at 425–26. 
 87. Id. at 426–27. 
 88. Id. at 428. 
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While the reasoning of Grant shrouds its subject in ambiguity, it provides 
an important foundation for later decisions.  While the Court’s later attempt 
to build upon Grant obscured the ballot-access standard of review even 
further, that subsequent case is more important in analyzing the 
constitutionality of residency and voter eligibility requirements for petition 
circulators. 
2.  Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. 
A decade later, the Court returned to the reasoning of the Grant decision 
in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.  The Court 
struck down three provisions of a Colorado law restricting the petitioning 
process for ballot initiatives.89  That law included a requirement that 
circulators be registered voters in Colorado.90  The Court maintained that it 
was applying the Grant framework consistently with earlier jurisprudence.91  
The majority opinion, however, failed to state the standard of review it was 
applying, although it used language from precedents of cases that used the 
tiered-scrutiny, balancing, and the combined approaches.92  The American 
Constitutional Law Foundation Court further complicated this area of the law 
by explicitly stating that the registration requirement involved a “severe 
burden on core political speech” but declining to formally define the resulting 
standard of review.93 
The Justices who did not join the majority opinion acknowledged this 
complication.94  Justice Thomas, who concurred only in the judgment, 
believed the majority deviated from the previous ballot-access framework as 
settled in Grant and that the Court should have been clear in applying “strict 
 
 89. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999).  The 
Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, 
and Stevens, bridged the Court’s typical ideological divisions. See id. at 185.  Justice Thomas 
concurred only in the judgment, while Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred 
in the judgment in part and dissented in part. Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist issued the lone 
dissent. Id. 
 90. Id. at 197. 
 91. See id. at 186–87. 
 92. See id. at 187, 192 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 
(1997); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)). 
 93. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 226 (2013) (“Without specifying 
the level of scrutiny, the [American Constitutional Law Foundation] Court concluded that the 
registration requirement was not justified . . . .”); see also Robin E. Perkins, Comment, A State 
Guide to Regulating Ballot Initiatives:  Reevaluating Constitutional Analysis Eight Years After 
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 723, 740 (noting 
the “confusion surrounding the Supreme Court’s analysis in Buckley”); Young, supra note 50, 
at 198 (“[T]he Court’s holding . . . further adds to the confusion over the application of the 
proper standard of review in ballot access cases.”).  But see Michael Carlin, Note, Buckley v. 
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.:  Emblem of the Struggle Between Citizens’ 
First Amendment Rights and States’ Regulatory Interests in Election Issues, 78 N.C. L. REV. 
477, 485 n.51 (2000) (positing that while “the Court did not explicitly state which level of 
scrutiny it applied[,] . . . the Court clearly purported to apply strict scrutiny, a test that required 
Colorado’s statutes to be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest’”(quoting Am. 
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 192 n.12)). 
 94. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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scrutiny.”95  Justice Thomas noted that the Court’s opinion seemed to agree 
that the restriction severely limited speech, but he argued that the Court erred 
in not explicitly requiring Colorado to demonstrate that its registration 
requirement was narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.96  The 
majority responded to Justice Thomas in a colloquy footnote that the holding 
was not inconsistent with earlier precedent and stated that it was “entirely in 
keeping” with what Justice Thomas called the “now-settled approach”—that 
restrictions severely burdening speech rights “be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.”97 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, also disagreed 
with the Court’s application of precedent concerning the standard of 
review.98  Justice O’Connor reasoned that the plaintiffs had not actually 
demonstrated a severe burden on their political speech rights and that the 
registration requirement was merely a “neutral qualification” that did not 
“directly prohibit otherwise qualified initiative petition circulators from 
circulating petitions.”99  Distinguishing this from the ban on payment to 
petition circulators struck down in Grant, she noted that, in that instance, “the 
statute directly silenced voices that were necessary, and ‘able and willing’ to 
convey a political message.”100  Justice O’Connor concluded that the Court’s 
precedents recommended applying “a less exacting standard of review” to 
this requirement, one closer to the traditional rational basis test.101 
While the majority did not clearly state its standard of review regarding 
the registration requirement, the Court applied language from a number of 
earlier cases in reaching its decision.102  It reasoned that Colorado’s 
registration requirement imposed a severe burden on political speech because 
it distinguished between registered voters and those “merely voter 
eligible.”103  The restriction would “‘limi[t] the number of voices who will 
convey [the initiative proponents’] message’ and, consequently, cut down 
‘the size of the audience [proponents] can reach.’”104 
The Court held that the requirement “impose[d] a burden on political 
expression that the State . . . failed to justify.”105  The state argued that the 
requirement did not severely limit speech because it was “easy to register to 
vote,” but the Court was not persuaded because some individuals in the state 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 192 n.12 (majority opinion). 
 98. Id. at 217–18 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 99. Id. at 218. 
 100. Id. at 218–19 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423 & n.6 (1988)). 
 101. Id. at 215, 220 (stating that precedent “requires that [the provision] advance a 
legitimate state interest to be a reasonable regulation of the electoral process”). 
 102. See id. at 186–87 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 
(1997); Grant, 486 U.S. 414; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Storer v. Brown, 
415 U.S. 724 (1974)). 
 103. Id. at 194–95.  
 104. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Grant, 486 U.S. at 422, 423).  The Court reasoned 
that as many as 964,000 eligible but unregistered voters in Colorado would be barred from 
circulating petitions. Id. at 193 n.15. 
 105. Id. at 195 (quoting Grant, 486 U.S. at 428). 
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declined to register due to political principle.106  The Court went on to assert 
that the state’s primary interest in “policing lawbreakers among petition 
circulators” was already achieved through other provisions in the law.107  As 
such, the registration requirement was unconstitutional because it imposed a 
severe burden by “cut[ting] down the number of message carriers in the 
ballot-access arena without impelling cause.”108 
In striking down the registration requirement, the Court made a point of 
acknowledging that it was not deciding the constitutionality of residency or 
“eligible-to-vote” requirements for circulators because the plaintiffs did not 
challenge that aspect of the Colorado law.109  The Court observed, however, 
that “assuming that a residence requirement would be upheld as a needful 
integrity-policing measure,” the unconstitutional registration requirement 
would not be needed to uphold the state’s interest in making circulators 
answerable to state law.110 
In the lone dissent, Chief Justice William Rehnquist accused the Court of 
undermining states’ efforts to “prevent fraud in the circulation of candidate 
petitions” and “ensure that local issues of state law are decided by local 
voters, rather than by out-of-state interests.”111  He argued that the Court 
misread the Grant framework, upended it, and called into question “any 
regulation of petition circulation which runs afoul of the highly abstract and 
mechanical test of diminishing the pool of petition circulators or making a 
proposal less likely to appear on the ballot.”112 
The Chief Justice also directly addressed the issue of residency 
requirements.  Decrying the Court’s “sphinx-like silence as to whether [a 
state] may even limit circulators to state residents,” Chief Justice Rehnquist 
questioned whether the Court’s new default of “voter eligible” individuals 
would be allowed to circulate petitions under the Court’s new test.113  He also 
addressed the important distinction between state residents and eligible 
voters, which are a “subset of [state] residents who have fulfilled the 
requirements for registration, and have not committed a felony or been 
otherwise disqualified from the franchise.”114  He believed a new default of 
those who were “voter eligible” in the wake of the Court’s decision was 
 
 106. Id. at 195–96. 
 107. Id. at 196 (“The interest in reaching law violators . . . is served by the requirement, 
upheld below, that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out . . . the ‘address at which he 
or she resides.’” (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-111(2) (1998))). 
 108. Id. at 197. 
 109. Id. (noting that the “[plaintiff] did not challenge Colorado’s right to require that all 
circulators be residents” and that “[no] eligible-to-vote qualification [was] in contest in this 
lawsuit”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 226 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 231 (noting that states should 
have the authority to limit circulators to those who can ultimately vote on the initiative and 
that concern about the rights of those consciously deciding not to register, or of convicted 
felons, “scarcely passes the ‘laugh test’”). 
 112. Id. at 227–28. 
 113. Id. at 228, 230. 
 114. Id. at 230–31. 
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untenable and unnecessarily burdensome on the state.115  The Chief Justice 
posited that states would now be required to perform background checks on 
petition circulators to ensure they were not felons or otherwise barred from 
voting.116 
Further, the Chief Justice believed that the Court was not clear on whether 
the term “voter eligible” meant “eligible to vote in the State” or “eligible to 
vote in any of the United States or its territories.”117  If the former, “it 
necessarily follows . . . that a State may limit . . . circulation to its own 
residents.”118  The latter reading would mean that a state would have to run 
background checks and perform a legal analysis for unregistered circulators 
to determine whether they were eligible to vote in their place of residence.119 
The Chief Justice also stated that he would not be opposed to the former 
reading, although he noted that allowing all state residents to circulate 
petitions would mean that “political dropouts . . . and convicted drug dealers 
[would] engage in this electoral activity.”120 
Rehnquist believed that because the Court did not explicitly address 
residency requirements, an extension of the Court’s logic would prompt 
future courts to hold “that being unable to hire out-of-state circulators would 
‘limi[t] the number of voices who will convey [the initiative proponents’] 
message’” to declare residency requirements unconstitutional.121  He argued 
that the conclusion of this chain of reasoning would not allow any restriction 
on the circulation process to survive.122  He opined, for example, that a 
prohibition on “children or foreigners from circulating petitions . . . would 
also limit the number of voices . . . and thus cut down on the size of the 
audience the initiative proponents could reach.”123  According to the Chief 
Justice, this logic would threaten to consume all restrictions not only on 
ballot-initiative petitions but also candidate-nominating petitions.124 
The majority responded to the Chief Justice’s concerns in a colloquy 
footnote.  It noted that the new Colorado default of those “eligible to vote” 
would not include felons, and his fear “that hordes of ‘convicted drug 
dealers[]’ will swell the ranks of petition circulators, unstoppable by 
legitimate state regulation, is therefore undue.”125  The Court similarly 
rebuked the Chief Justice’s fear of courts applying its logic to include 
“children and citizens of foreign lands,” admonished his opinion as a 
“familiar parade of dreadfuls,”126 and advised him that while “[j]udges and 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 230. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 230–31. 
 120. Id. at 230. 
 121. Id. at 231 (alterations in original) (quoting id. at 194 (majority opinion)). 
 122. Id. at 231–32. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 232. 
 125. Id. at 194 n.16 (majority opinion) (quoting id. at 230 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)). 
 126. Id. 
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lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies[,] they are not supposed to ski 
it to the bottom.”127 
Ultimately, although American Constitutional Law Foundation did not 
clearly articulate its standard of review regarding the registration requirement 
and further complicated this area of law, the opinion’s understanding of 
earlier precedent forms the core backdrop against which circuit courts have 
analyzed the constitutionality of residency and eligibility requirements. 
C.  Election Law Challenges in the Twenty-First Century 
In the nineteen years since American Constitutional Law Foundation, U.S. 
elections have been subject to several legal, technological, and cultural 
developments that pose new challenges for legislatures, courts, and voters.  
These challenges include cyber threats,128 “fake news”129 and “alternative 
facts,”130 and targeted partisan redistricting.131  Such developments, coupled 
with the Court’s striking down of section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act,132 
have prompted renewed concerns about voter suppression and the overall 
integrity of the electoral process.133 
 
 127. Id. (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 169 (1990)). 
 128. See Alexa Corse, Election Officials, Homeland Security Begin to Formalize 
Cybersecurity Efforts, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2017, 3:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
election-officials-homeland-security-begin-to-formalize-cybersecurity-efforts-1501268605 
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One particular area of concern is the potential for foreign interference in 
the democratic process.134  For example, the FBI and the intelligence 
community, as well as both houses of Congress, have begun investigating the 
numerous ways the Russian government sought to influence and undermine 
the integrity of the 2016 election.135  These efforts included cyberattacks,136 
advertising and false information campaigns perpetrated on television and 
social media,137 and even possible collaboration and collusion with Donald 
Trump’s campaign.138  Hillary Clinton, partially blaming her electoral loss 
on Russian meddling, has raised concerns about the implications of this 
interference on the integrity of future elections nationwide.139 
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Additionally, the last decade has brought renewed emphasis on potential 
“voter fraud.”140  President Donald Trump has posited, albeit without 
evidence, that millions of people “voted illegally”141 for Hillary Clinton in 
2016, and in response he created a commission to investigate in-person “voter 
fraud.”142  States have used this largely unfounded143 fear of “voter fraud” to 
pass scores of new election statutes that include controversial voter-
identification requirements.144  These laws have been criticized as partisan 
attempts to subvert voting rights of African Americans and Democratic-
leaning voters.145 
The twenty-first century has also seen the rising influence of so-called 
“dark money” in politics.146  Billionaires and well-funded interest groups 
continue to spend more money in election campaigns and are more frequently 
spending this money to influence increasingly local elections.147  There is 
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concern that candidates and issues supported by these well-funded interests 
have an enormous advantage in the electoral process.148 
These issues provide important context for courts deciding the 
constitutionality of residency and eligibility requirements for petition 
circulators.149  Accordingly, the next Part discusses the split among circuit 
courts on these constitutional questions. 
II.  THE SPLIT:  DO RESIDENCY AND VOTER ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENTS VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
In the wake of American Constitutional Law Foundation, circuits agree 
that the holding applies to candidate-nominating petitions as well as ballot-
initiative petitions150 but are ultimately split on the question of whether the 
holding of American Constitutional Law Foundation instructs that residency 
and eligibility requirements for petition circulators violate the First 
Amendment.151 
The Eighth Circuit has held state-residency requirements to be 
constitutional,152 and the Second Circuit seemingly has agreed in dicta.153  
Conversely, the majority of circuits, and all circuits that have directly 
considered the question since 2001, have held these restrictions to be an 
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.154  Part II.A discusses the 
minority view, which reasons that these restrictions are constitutional.  Part 
II.B discusses the majority view and the relevant arguments that the 
restrictions are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
A.  The Minority View:  Residency and Voter Eligibility Requirements 
Are Permissible Under the First Amendment 
The Eighth Circuit is the only federal appellate court to explicitly hold that 
state-residency requirements are constitutional.155  The Second Circuit, 
although declining to explicitly rule on the constitutionality of residency 
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requirements, approvingly cited such a restriction in dicta of a related case.156  
While the Second Circuit struck down a more stringent statutory provision, 
it treated the state-residency requirement as de facto constitutional.157 
Besides the circumstances of their holdings, the two cases are remarkably 
different.  The Eighth Circuit case, Initiative & Referendum Institute v. 
Jaeger,158 involved a restriction on ballot-initiative petition circulators, as at 
issue in American Constitutional Law Foundation, while the Second Circuit 
case, Lerman v. Board of Elections,159 involved circulators for candidate-
nominating petitions.160  Despite the similarity in their outcomes, these two 
decisions differ greatly in scope, standard of review, and reading of the 
proper precedent and application of American Constitutional Law 
Foundation. 
In discussing statutory requirements that petition circulators be in-state 
residents, both circuits alluded to their view of American Constitutional Law 
Foundation’s treatment of the issue.  The circuits relied on the Court’s 
reference to voter eligibility requirements as a more narrowly tailored—and 
therefore constitutionally acceptable—approach through which a state could 
exercise its interest in “ensuring the integrity of the ballot access process.”161  
Although conceding that the American Constitutional Law Foundation Court 
did not explicitly rule on the constitutionality of state-residency or voter 
eligibility requirements because the issue was not properly raised, both 
circuits inferred that the Court had all but decided the issue in making this 
assertion.162 
Despite this contention, the Eighth Circuit conducted an independent 
analysis of the constitutionality of the North Dakota state-residency 
requirement because the plaintiffs facially challenged the restriction.163  The 
Second Circuit declined to conduct a similar analysis for the New York state-
residency restriction because the circuit considered the issue only in the 
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Found., 525 U.S. at 194–97). 
 162. Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 616 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 194–97); 
Lerman, 232 F.3d at 150 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 194); see also 
supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 163. Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 616. 
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context of the more stringent jurisdictional residency requirement being 
challenged before them.164 
The Eighth Circuit read American Constitutional Law Foundation as 
applying the balancing/sliding scale test, as opposed to tiered scrutiny.165  
The court understood that a less stringent review was appropriate for the 
residency requirement, due to its analysis of the burden that the restriction 
imposed on the plaintiffs.166 
The Eighth Circuit found that the residency restriction did not impose a 
severe burden on speech or significantly reduce the number of available 
messengers, which it saw as the key distinction from the restriction struck 
down in American Constitutional Law Foundation.167  The residency 
requirement allowed a pool of over 476,000 North Dakota residents to assist 
with petitioning.168  In the court’s view, this stood in contrast with the 
Colorado registration requirement struck down in American Constitutional 
Law Foundation, where a significant number of state residents would have 
been prevented from circulating petitions.169 
Crucially, in analyzing this burden, the Eighth Circuit found no actual 
evidence of the residency requirement “making it more costly and time 
consuming to collect signatures.”170  It noted that since the state had been 
tracking the success rate of signature campaigns, roughly 70 percent of all 
initiative campaigns were able to secure their place on the ballot.171  The 
court weighed what it saw as a nearly nonexistent burden against the state’s 
“compelling interest in preventing fraud”172 and ultimately found the state-
residency requirement to be a reasonable regulation to advance the state’s 
interest.173 
Conversely, the Second Circuit read American Constitutional Law 
Foundation to imply that strict scrutiny was the applicable standard.174  In 
ruling on New York’s jurisdictional residency requirement, the court found 
the burdens imposed on petition circulators’ speech to be severe.175  While 
requiring that circulators reside in the political subdivision where the election 
was taking place was not narrowly tailored to advance the state’s compelling 
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 175. Id. 
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interest in preventing fraud, the circuit reasoned that a state-residency 
requirement was a more narrowly tailored option to advance that interest.176 
After deciding their respective standards of review, both circuits gave great 
weight to the state’s “compelling interest in preventing fraud” and abuse, as 
well as the state’s related interest in “ensuring that circulators answer to the 
[state] subpoena power.”177  The Second Circuit placed particular emphasis 
on the statewide subpoena power in holding that a state-residency 
requirement, as opposed to an individual jurisdictional residency 
requirement, was narrowly tailored to achieve this compelling state 
interest.178 
The Eighth Circuit further reasoned that out-of-state residents who wished 
to engage in political speech in North Dakota had many alternatives through 
which to exercise that right.179  These included speaking to voters about 
initiatives, training circulators, and even accompanying circulators to collect 
the requisite number of signatures.180  The only restriction mandated by the 
statute, the court concluded, was that nonresidents could not “personally 
collect and verify signatures,” a restriction clearly “justified by the State’s 
interest.”181 
Although the Eighth Circuit did not address the merits of the argument 
outright, the opinion acknowledged the state’s interest in preventing well-
funded interest groups located outside the state from hijacking the initiative 
process, as well as the interest in ensuring that an initiative actually had 
sufficient grassroots support among the people of North Dakota before being 
placed on the ballot.182 
The Second Circuit did not find this state interest in preventing outsiders 
from influencing the politics of a local jurisdiction to be “legitimate at all.”183  
In weighing New York’s argument, the court reasoned that “a desire to fence 
out non-residents’ political speech—and to prevent both residents and non-
residents from associating for political purposes across district boundaries—
simply cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment’s purpose of ensuring 
‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources.’”184 
Acknowledging the unclear nature of the standard of review in ballot-
access cases,185 the Eighth Circuit concluded its opinion by noting that even 
if a court were to apply Justice Thomas’s logic and find that strict scrutiny 
 
 176. Id. at 150 & n.14. 
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 183. Lerman, 232 F.3d at 152. 
 184. Id. (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 866 (7th Cir. 2000)).  Despite holding 
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was the applicable standard for a state-residency requirement, that 
requirement was sufficiently narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest 
in preventing fraud to pass constitutional muster.186 
The Eighth Circuit was confident in the soundness of its logic and its 
conclusion that the Supreme Court had already all but decided the issue in 
favor of constitutionality.  That circuit, however, remains the only federal 
court of appeals to explicitly uphold the constitutionality of a state’s 
residency requirement for petition circulators in its holding.  Likewise, the 
Second Circuit’s statements on state-residency requirements have not yet 
been overturned, and New York law still requires petition circulators to reside 
in the state.187 
B.  The Majority View:  Residency and Voter Eligibility 
Requirements Violate the First Amendment 
Jaeger notwithstanding, in the wake of American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, a “consensus . . . emerged [among circuits] that petitioning 
restrictions . . . are subject to strict scrutiny analysis.”188  The Fourth,189 
Sixth,190 Seventh,191 Ninth,192 and Tenth Circuits193 have applied this 
reading of American Constitutional Law Foundation to strike down various 
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Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Sec’y of State, No. Civ 98-104-B-C, 1999 WL 33117172, at 
*16 (D. Me. Apr. 23, 1999)). 
 187. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-132, 6-140 (McKinney 2017).  New York’s election law 
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“eligible” to vote. See GOLDFEDER, supra note 4, at 20–21.  In his lawsuit, Merced challenges 
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to be unconstitutional (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-543 (2013))). 
 190. Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 462 (6th Cir. 2008) (striking down an Ohio law 
limiting candidate-nomination petition circulators to registered voters in an individual 
precinct, who were also in-state residents of Ohio, as applied to Green Party presidential 
candidate Ralph Nader). 
 191. Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 866 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding an Illinois statute 
requiring candidate-nomination petition circulators to be both registered to vote and residents 
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state petitioning restrictions, including both residency and voter eligibility 
requirements, as well as restrictions on both initiative and candidate-
nominating petition circulators. 
This near-universal application of strict scrutiny largely flowed from the 
Tenth Circuit, which had issued the decision the Court affirmed in American 
Constitutional Law Foundation.194  In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit explicitly 
applied strict scrutiny to the Colorado registration requirement to find it 
unconstitutional.195  In subsequent cases, the judges of the Tenth Circuit 
reasoned that because the American Constitutional Law Foundation Court 
had affirmed their decision, the Court had clearly endorsed strict scrutiny as 
the applicable standard for ballot-access cases meeting similar criteria.196  
Nearly all circuits weighing similar restrictions on petition circulation in the 
following years opted to follow the Tenth Circuit’s lead.197 
A common element among the circuits applying strict scrutiny is their 
frequent citation to Justice Thomas’s American Constitutional Law 
Foundation concurrence in the judgment as guiding precedent for future 
cases.198  In relying on Justice Thomas’s assertions that strict scrutiny is the 
applicable standard of review, circuits have repeatedly referred to the 
colloquy in footnote twelve from the majority opinion in American 
Constitutional Law Foundation.199  These circuits seem to reference this 
footnote to suggest that the American Constitutional Law Foundation 
majority approved of Justice Thomas’s discussion of the Grant framework 
and thus cited to Justice Thomas’s concurrence as a clearer distillation of the 
majority’s thoughts on the appropriate standard of review.200 
Citing language from American Constitutional Law Foundation and 
Grant, the majority-view circuits reasoned that state-residency and voter 
eligibility requirements imposed a severe burden on First Amendment rights 
by significantly reducing the number of available petition circulators, much 
like the Colorado registration requirement struck down in American 
 
 194. Am. Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, Inc., 120 F.3d 1092, 1100 (10th Cir. 1997), 
aff’d sub nom. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Chandler v. City of Arvada, 292 F.3d 1236, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2002); Campbell 
v. Buckley, 203 F.3d 738, 744–45 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 197. See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 317 (4th Cir. 2013); Nader 
v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2008); Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1035 
(9th Cir. 2008); Lerman v. Bd. of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 2000); Krislov v. 
Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 866 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 198. See, e.g., Blackwell, 545 F.3d at 475 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 
at 210–11 (Thomas, J., concurring)); Lerman, 232 F.3d at 145–46 (citing Am. Constitutional 
Law Found., 525 U.S. at 206, 210–12 (Thomas, J., concurring)); Krislov, 226 F.3d at 860 
(citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 199. See, e.g., Blackwell, 545 F.3d at 475 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 
at 192 n.12); Chandler, 292 F.3d at 1241 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 
192 n.12); Lerman, 232 F.3d at 146 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 192 
n.12). 
 200. See, e.g., Blackwell, 545 F.3d at 475 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 
at 210–11 (Thomas, J., concurring)); Chandler, 292 F.3d at 1242 (citing Am. Constitutional 
Law Found., 525 U.S. at 207 (Thomas, J., concurring)); Lerman, 232 F.3d at 146 (citing Am. 
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 210–12 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
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Constitutional Law Foundation.201  Using this burden analysis, the circuits 
reasoned that the holding meant that strict scrutiny was the applicable 
standard of review.202 
Next, the circuits weighed whether the statutes were narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.203  The states in these cases argued several 
such interests they considered to be compelling.204  Many of the circuits 
recognized, and some of the plaintiffs even stipulated, that these interests 
were compelling, especially the state interests in election integrity and 
preventing fraud and abuse.205 
For other interests, however, the circuits were not as accepting.  The Tenth 
Circuit stated that it did not view Oklahoma’s stated interest in “restricting 
the process of self-government to members of its own political community” 
to be compelling in the context of restrictions on petition circulation.206  It 
reasoned that finding such a compelling interest could have “far reaching 
consequences,” such as laws prohibiting nonresidents from driving 
Oklahoma voters to the polls.207 
The Seventh Circuit recognized a legitimate state interest in “ensur[ing] 
that only [state] residents have a say in electing their representatives.”208  The 
Circuit found, however, that Illinois did not have a similar compelling 
interest in “preventing citizens of other States from having any influence on 
[its] elections” whatsoever.209  It noted that residency requirements for 
circulators were “harmful to the unity of our Nation” because “[a]llowing 
citizens of the other forty-nine States to circulate petitions increases the 
opportunity for the free flow of political ideas.”210  The Circuit further 
reasoned that nonresidents could possibly introduce “ideas which are novel 
to a particular geographic area, or which are unpopular.”211  “[T]he First 
 
 201. See Judd, 718 F.3d at 316 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422–23 (1988)); 
Blackwell, 545 F.3d at 474–75 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 191, 197); 
Brewer, 531 F.3d at 1036 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 194–95); 
Chandler, 292 F.3d at 1243 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 194–195); 
Krislov, 226 F.3d at 860 (citing Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 193 n.15; Grant, 
486 U.S. at 421–22). 
 202. See Judd, 718 F.3d at 317 (“[A]n election regulation that imposes a severe burden is 
subject to strict scrutiny . . . .” (quoting Brewer, 531 F.3d at 1035)); Blackwell, 545 F.3d at 
475 (noting that the Court applies “strict scrutiny” to such regulations); Brewer, 531 F.3d at 
1036 (“Because the restriction creates a severe burden on plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, 
strict scrutiny applies.”); Krislov, 226 F.3d at 863 (stating that “[l]aws which place a 
substantial burden on First Amendment rights” must be “narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest”). 
 203. See supra note 56. 
 204. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 205. See, e.g., Judd, 718 F.3d at 317 (“The plaintiffs do not seriously dispute that the 
prevention of election fraud is a compelling state interest.”); Brewer, 531 F.3d at 1037 (“A 
state’s interest in ensuring the integrity of the election process and preventing fraud is 
compelling.”). 
 206. Yes on Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023, 1028 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 865 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 209. Id. at 866. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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Amendment,” the court held, “was designed to secure the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources and to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social change desired by the people.”212 
Regardless of whether the circuits found a compelling interest that would 
possibly justify the restrictions, the circuits universally found the restrictions 
to be insufficiently narrowly tailored to those interests to survive strict 
scrutiny review.213  The Seventh Circuit, for example, noted that the 
residency requirement was not narrowly tailored to an interest in ensuring 
that only state residents elected state representatives, as Illinois already had 
restrictions stating that only registered Illinois voters could sign petitions and 
vote in its elections.214  The residency requirement, therefore, was 
superfluous.215 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in analyzing Oklahoma’s residency restriction 
in the context of its stated interest in fraud prevention, found that the state 
had failed to demonstrate that nonresidents, as a class, were more likely to 
engage in fraudulent activity, or less likely to answer a subpoena, than state-
resident circulators.216 
To further illustrate that the restrictions were not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored, some circuits cited possible alternatives to advance the states’ 
interest in preventing fraud that would be less burdensome on First 
Amendment rights.  A common suggestion was for the states to require 
circulators to file affidavits swearing that they would be answerable to the 
jurisdiction to address any irregularities or stricken signatures on their 
petitions.217  The circuits found that the provisions at issue were not narrowly 
tailored because the states failed to provide any legitimate reasons why these 
proposed less-restrictive alternatives were unworkable.218 
By universally determining that the restrictions failed to be narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest, the majority-view circuits declared the 
 
 212. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 213. See supra notes 189–93. 
 214. See supra notes 189–93. 
 215. See supra notes 189–93. 
 216. Yes on Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Because 
the record contains insufficient evidence to conclude that non-residents, as a class, threaten 
the integrity or reliability of the initiative process, Oklahoma has failed to prove that banning 
all non-resident circulators is a narrowly tailored means of meeting its compelling interest.”); 
see also Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the state did not 
“ever contend that its history of fraud was related to non-resident circulators, a history that 
might justify regulating non-residents differently from residents”). 
 217. See Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 318 (4th Cir. 2013); Savage, 550 
F.3d at 1030; Brewer, 531 F.3d at 1037. 
 218. Judd, 718 F.3d at 318 (“[T]he Board has produced no concrete evidence . . . 
explaining why the plaintiffs’ proposed solution . . . would be unworkable or impracticable.”); 
Savage, 550 F.3d at 1031 (“Oklahoma has . . . failed to prove the ineffectiveness of plausible 
alternatives to the blanket ban on non-residents.”); Brewer, 531 F.3d at 1037 (“The state 
responds that petition circulators could conceivably be spread throughout the country, and that 
given the narrow timeframe for petition challenges in Arizona, such a . . . system would be 
unworkable.  The state does not provide any evidence, however, to support this 
contention . . . .”). 
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restrictions to be unconstitutional violations of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.219 
III.  RESOLVING THE SPLIT:  A WAY FORWARD 
Although the split on this issue is admittedly one sided, the Eighth Circuit 
view should not be so easily cast aside.  As recently as 2016, the Sixth Circuit 
considered the split on the constitutionality of these restrictions to be open 
ended and unresolved, and it found the Eighth Circuit’s view to be a 
reasonable interpretation.220  While circuit courts have unanimously struck 
down residency and eligibility requirements under the First Amendment 
since 2001, this issue has far greater significance than these circuit decisions 
have suggested.  Ultimately, although it has been given short shrift by its 
sister circuits and lacks depth in some aspects, the Eighth Circuit view is 
ultimately the most reasonable application of American Constitutional Law 
Foundation. 
Part III.A discusses the shortcomings of the majority approach to 
determining the appropriate standard of review and advocates for a return to 
an ad hoc balancing analysis in ballot-access cases.  Part III.B applies this 
suggested method to draw a constitutional distinction between residency and 
voter eligibility requirements. It posits that residency requirements are a 
reasonable state regulation of the electoral process, while voter eligibility 
requirements present an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.  
Finally, Part III.C discusses the practical and philosophical reasons 
underlying this approach, as addressed in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent. 
A.  Revisiting the Eighth Circuit View:  
A Proper Reading of American Constitutional Law Foundation and a 
Return to Balancing 
Establishing a consistent ballot-access standard of review is a monumental 
task that has eluded the Court since it first held that these cases were 
justiciable.221  It is crucial that the method for choosing this standard 
promotes enough flexibility to account for the enormous variations and 
intricacies between the state and individual interests in ballot-access cases.  
Part III.A.1 reconciles the holding of American Constitutional Law 
Foundation with a renewed emphasis on the Anderson sliding-scale 
approach.  Part III.A.2 argues for a more realistic assessment of the state and 
individual interests presented in ballot-access litigation. 
 
 219. Judd, 718 F.3d at 318–19; Savage, 550 F.3d at 1031; Brewer, 531 F.3d at 1038. 
 220. See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 443 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that 
the existence of the circuit split meant that Ohio’s Secretary of State could enforce Ohio’s 
residency requirement due to a reasonable belief that the statute was constitutional). 
 221. See Kevin Cofsky, Note, Pruning the Political Thicket:  The Case for Strict Scrutiny 
of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 366 (1996).  See generally Young, 
supra note 50. 
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1.  Rejecting Strict Scrutiny:  
An Individualized Balancing Reading 
The circuit courts’ emphasis on the proper standard of review has distorted 
the real question at issue in every one of these ballot-access cases—whether 
the challenged restriction presents an unconstitutional burden on political 
speech and whether the asserted state interest justifies that burden.  Because 
each challenged ballot-access restriction presents a unique set of 
circumstances and factors that speak to the state and individual interests at 
issue,222 this area of the law is particularly well suited to a specific and 
nuanced analysis. 
Despite the near-universal finding of residency and eligibility 
requirements as severe burdens on core political speech mandating strict 
scrutiny review,223 this reading of American Constitutional Law Foundation 
fundamentally misreads the Court’s precedents.  A close reading of the 
majority-view circuit opinions shows that the use of strict scrutiny does not 
arise from a detailed understanding of American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, Grant, and other earlier case law.  Rather, this approach is best 
explained by the circuit courts’ desire to establish a clear and concise 
framework for deciding the appropriate standard of review in ballot-access 
cases.  While these courts’ search for clarity is understandable, the holding 
of American Constitutional Law Foundation is not nearly as simple or clear 
cut as the majority-view circuits make it out to be. 
It is apparent that over the course of the Supreme Court’s history, the Court 
has seemed to favor a more individualized and flexible approach to ballot-
access restrictions, even if it has not done so explicitly.224  The Court has 
even stated that it would be a mistake to overly rely on strict scrutiny and that 
a more flexible approach is crucial to properly weigh the competing interests 
inherent in these cases.225 
While not explicitly referencing its standard of review, even while finding 
a “severe burden,” the American Constitutional Law Foundation majority 
ultimately appears to favor the “exacting” scrutiny approach from Grant.226  
Although the Court does not explicitly state the standard of review, it makes 
 
 222. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330, 335 (1972)); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (noting that each individual 
ballot-access decision “consider[s] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests 
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by 
the classification”). 
 223. See supra Part II.B. 
 224. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Wright, supra note 70, at 210 (“Balancing and 
proportionality plainly inhere in the idea of a sufficiently important government interest, given 
that the sufficiency of the government interest must be with respect to some corresponding 
burden imposed upon constitutional rights.”); Cofsky, supra note 221, at 381 (discussing the 
remarkable span of precedents cited by the Court in developing the Anderson balancing test). 
 225. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972); McDonald v. Bd. of 
Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)). 
 226. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192 n.12, 199 (1999). 
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several references to Grant and ultimately states its aim to replicate Grant’s 
test.227 
Many of the majority-view circuits have viewed Grant’s “exacting” 
scrutiny language as interchangeable with traditional strict scrutiny.228  
Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’s concurrences in the judgment 
appear to understand the terms as being interchangeable.229  Additionally, 
because the flexible Grant “exacting” scrutiny standard has sometimes 
required that a statute be “narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest,” 
this has understandably confused many courts and commentators.230 
The majority-view circuits, as well as several commentators, have cited 
American Constitutional Law Foundation’s footnote twelve as proof that the 
American Constitutional Law Foundation majority applied strict scrutiny to 
the Colorado registration requirement and that the Court shared Justice 
Thomas’s view of the ballot-access framework.231  The Court’s one-off 
contention that its “decision is entirely in keeping with the ‘now-settled 
approach’ that state regulations ‘impos[ing] “severe burdens” on speech . . . 
[must] be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,’” however, 
is not dispositive that this was the test the Court applied.232  Indeed, apart 
from this footnote, the traditional strict scrutiny language does not appear at 
all in the majority opinion.233 
This colloquy footnote, using quotation marks around “now settled” when 
referring to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in the judgment,234 serves merely 
to put Justice Thomas and lower courts at ease.  The footnote states that the 
Court’s American Constitutional Law Foundation opinion did not overrule 
decades of earlier precedent—it was not a definitive declaration that strict 
scrutiny is the applicable standard in cases involving a severe burden on core 
political speech.235 
Because of the great weight given to footnote twelve, most of the majority-
view circuits have cited to Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which explicitly 
outlines strict scrutiny as the applicable standard.236  Indeed, if one assumes 
that “strict scrutiny” and “exacting scrutiny” are interchangeable terms, 
Justice Thomas’s opinion provides a clear, rigid, and concise framework 
 
 227. See id. at 186. 
 228. See supra notes 73–74, 194–200 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 232. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 192 n.12 (alteration in original) (quoting 
id. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring)); see supra Part I.B.2. 
 233. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 192 n.12 (alteration in original) (quoting 
id. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Kurt Wittenberg, Anderson v. Celebrezze:  Ballot Access and the Due Process 
Clause—an Alternative to Equal Protection Analysis, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 411, 428 (1984) 
(noting “the Court’s apparent unwillingness to overrule prior ballot-access cases and its 
preference for distinguishing them beyond sense and recognition”). 
 236. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 207 (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra 
note 200. 
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through which lower courts can analyze similar restrictions to those at issue 
in American Constitutional Law Foundation and Grant. 
Because of this reading of the opinion, many circuits seem to suggest that 
footnote twelve somehow transforms Justice Thomas’s concurrence into an 
opinion that more concisely explains the Court’s holding.  It is important to 
note, however, that Justice Thomas’s view was solely his own, and he 
explicitly concurred only in the judgment.237  Attractive as Justice Thomas’s 
summary of the ballot-access framework may be in its simplicity, lower 
courts’ reliance on his opinion is misplaced. 
The American Constitutional Law Foundation majority peppered its 
opinion with several references to the precedents of other cases that weighed 
ballot-access restrictions under multiple standards of review, including the 
more ad hoc balancing test from Anderson.238  Even if the American 
Constitutional Law Foundation Court stated that “exacting scrutiny” was the 
appropriate standard of review for the registration requirement, this could 
have been an indication of favoring a more flexible and evenhanded approach 
to weighing the restrictions.239  Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion, 
although it featured inconsistent precedents from prior cases, spanned the 
Court’s wide ideological gap and gained the support of four other Justices.240  
Because the majority opinion is controlling doctrine, it merits a more careful 
examination by lower courts than it has received. 
Instead, the most logical way for lower courts to apply American 
Constitutional Law Foundation would be to rely on the balancing test from 
Anderson to weigh the “character and magnitude” of the burdens imposed on 
the plaintiff.241  Then, depending on the level of the “burden,” the courts 
should apply “exacting” scrutiny in cases involving severe or heavy burdens 
and “rational basis” review to those with lesser burdens.  The definition of 
“exacting scrutiny” should then involve its own sliding-scale test of sorts by 
using language from traditional intermediate scrutiny for “severe” burdens 
and reserving the language from traditional strict scrutiny for the most blatant 
cases of infringement where the plaintiff has demonstrated a concrete and 
egregious burden on her rights.  The Court does this sort of leveled “sliding 
scale” already, even though it has not done so explicitly—there are no 
definitive criteria for finding a “severe burden” on speech.242  Melding the 
 
 237. See supra note 89. 
 238. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. at 187, 192. 
 239. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.  Indeed, the American Constitutional 
Law Foundation majority explicitly outlined “exacting scrutiny” as the appropriate standard 
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 241. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
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standards together in this way, as in American Constitutional Law 
Foundation and Grant, would provide some guidance to lower courts, while 
allowing the flexibility to achieve the right result for each individual 
restriction.243 
While this proposed approach would require further review and testing, it 
fits within the Court’s earlier framework while recognizing the reality that 
different regulatory schemes across state lines “make[] it difficult to rely 
heavily on precedent in evaluating such restrictions.”244  The proposed 
approach offers a way to avoid reliance on rigid tiered scrutiny, which is 
better suited to the Court’s equal protection framework, or on the Anderson 
balancing test, which has been criticized as too loosely defined to offer any 
meaningful guidance for courts on how to rule.245  This combined standard 
would solve the Court’s consistency problem, while focusing the analysis 
back to the root question of ballot-access cases—whether the regulatory 
interests of the state sufficiently justify the burden on individual 
constitutional rights. 
2.  Recalibrating the “Sliding Scale”:  A Twenty-First Century 
Understanding of State Interests and Burdens on Political Speech 
In addition to emphasizing flexibility and individualized balancing in the 
Court’s standard of review, tribunals should also reexamine the precise state 
and individual interests balanced under this approach.  It is crucial for courts 
not only to renew their efforts to return to the root questions of ballot-access 
litigation under the First Amendment but also to give both the state and 
individual interests an appropriate amount of weight in the actual context of 
twenty-first century elections. 
Following the analysis of the American Constitutional Law Foundation 
Court, the majority-view circuits reasoned that residency and voter eligibility 
restrictions constitute a “severe burden” on core political speech because they 
drastically reduce the number of individuals able to convey the plaintiffs’ 
message.246  This analysis of the burden assumes that these requirements 
would impact plaintiffs and circulators in similar ways to how the registration 
requirement impacted state residents of Colorado who were not registered to 
vote.  The majority-view circuits, therefore, fundamentally broaden the scope 
of American Constitutional Law Foundation’s holding by misconstruing the 
scope of the “denominator” for this test.247 
A close reading of the American Constitutional Law Foundation majority 
opinion shows that the Court meant the burden test to apply to reducing the 
 
 243. For further analysis of a similar proposed test, see E. Jon A. Gryskiewicz, Note, 
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 246. See supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra Part II.B. 
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number of messengers in the state, as opposed to reducing the number of 
messengers in the abstract, as the majority-view circuits contend.248  
Tailoring the burden analysis to state residents focuses on the limits placed 
on the speech rights of citizens with a demonstrable stake in the outcome of 
the petitioning process and the electoral politics of their state of residence. 
Furthermore, the Grant Court, which accepted that a state restriction 
imposed a severe burden by “limit[ing] the number of voices” able to convey 
a political message, analyzed the payment ban in the context of state 
residents.249  The unanimous Grant Court expressed concern that the 
restriction “limit[ed] [plaintiffs’] ability to make the matter the focus of 
statewide discussion.”250  The majority-view circuits’ far broader application 
of the burden analysis fundamentally misunderstands this notion, seemingly 
applying the test in an abstract or universal context. 
As Justice O’Connor noted in her American Constitutional Law 
Foundation opinion, even though petition circulation is unquestionably 
political speech, the issue whether a burden is “severe” is by itself an 
ambiguous question without a clear answer.251  The Court must develop 
better criteria for determining whether a restriction in fact imposes a “severe” 
burden on core political speech, such as a list of determinative factors.252 
Even if the majority-view circuits properly weighed the burden on the 
plaintiffs’ core political speech as severe, these circuits also gave insufficient 
weight to the states’ asserted interests.253  Given the challenges inherent in 
administering elections in the twenty-first century,254 courts should give 
additional weight to the states’ interest in protecting the integrity of the 
democratic process.  The technological, legal, and cultural changes of the 
twenty-first century have allowed the framers’ worst fears about corrupting 
influence and foreign interference in American democracy to take root, 
which underscores the paramount need for states to uphold their 
constitutional duty to maintain the integrity of elections.255 
While undervaluing the state’s interest in protecting the integrity of 
elections, many courts equate this interest with, and give great weight to, the 
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state’s interest in preventing “fraud.”256  Preventing fraud, however, connotes 
protecting against a more specific, and blatant, corruption of the electoral 
process than the general interest in election integrity.  States have previously 
used this interest in preventing fraud to justify legislation that has the effect, 
if not the purpose, of targeting certain groups of voters.257  If given too much 
weight, this asserted interest has the potential to allow states to further use 
their election regulation powers for improper—if not outright 
discriminatory—purposes.  While courts should not disregard this interest, 
they must perform a more intensive analysis of the state’s claims.  For 
example, they could require a demonstration of actual fraud or abuse 
prevented by the challenged statute.258 
Some courts have also given short shrift to a state’s interest in ensuring 
that voters within the state decide the outcomes of elections.259  Although 
some of the majority-view circuits have held that this interest is not legitimate 
or compelling, this contention overlooks the possibility of well-financed 
outside groups corrupting a state’s ballot process.260  While the Seventh and 
Second Circuits have found this beneficial,261 the idea of outsiders bringing 
in novel or originally unpopular ideas is a quaint fantasy and does not reflect 
the real potential of national interests essentially purchasing the right to have 
their favored initiative questions and candidates placed on the ballot in any 
state.  There is a real possibility of these groups using their resources to access 
a state’s ballot in a way that less well-funded, local grassroots interests could 
not. 
Because of this, a state has a strong interest in candidates and initiative 
proponents demonstrating a “modicum of support” in the community before 
being allowed access to the ballot.262  This principle has been integral to 
elections since the founding of the republic and is embedded in the structure 
of both state and federal elections.263  Just as progressive reformers sought to 
implement the ballot initiative as a way for state residents to reclaim their 
government from well-funded interest groups, the framers gave states control 
over elections to avoid favoring the wealthy and privileged in American 
society.264 
 
 256. See, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) (discussing a need for 
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 257. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, each contested restriction under the American Constitutional 
Law Foundation framework has nuances that require both the interests of the 
state and burdens on the plaintiffs to be calculated in an individualized 
manner.  While the analysis of these burdens and interests will vary 
depending on the context in which they are raised, it is important for courts 
to weigh these factors in a way that reflects both the reality of elections in the 
twenty-first century and the framers’ intent in establishing the constitutional 
structure of election law. 
B.  Practical Applications:  The Differing Results for Residency 
and Voter Eligibility Requirements 
Courts that have weighed the constitutionality of voter eligibility and 
residency requirements have treated the two types of requirements as 
indistinguishable from one another for purposes of constitutional analysis.265  
Under the standard proposed in this Note, however, the analysis should be 
conducted differently, as each presents unique burdens and interests that must 
be properly considered.  Part III.B.1 conducts a constitutional analysis of 
residency requirements and concludes that they should be upheld as a 
reasonable exercise of the state’s regulatory authority.  Part III.B.2 
undertakes a similar analysis for voter eligibility requirements and finds them 
to be an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of speech. 
1.  Residency Requirements:  
A Logical Place to Draw the Constitutional Line 
The American Constitutional Law Foundation Court maintained a 
“sphinx-like silence” on the constitutionality of state-residency 
requirements.266  Although the clear majority of circuits that have heard 
challenges to state-residency requirements for petition circulators have found 
them to be an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights, this 
analysis has come from the flawed notion that traditional strict scrutiny is the 
applicable standard of review.267 
The Eighth Circuit’s understanding of the burdens on the plaintiffs, 
although sparse on analysis, is the most correct given the challenges of 
twenty-first century election law.  Rather than assuming that limiting petition 
circulators to state residents is a de facto severe burden by reducing the 
number of available messengers, courts should conduct their own 
individualized sliding-scale analysis of each contested restriction to 
determine the burdens imposed on the plaintiffs.  By the Eighth Circuit’s 
understanding, the North Dakota state-residency requirement did not impose 
a “severe burden” on core political speech because there were hundreds of 
 
 265. Compare, e.g., Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 316–17 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(analyzing the constitutionality of a voter-eligibility requirement), with Nader v. Brewer, 531 
F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing the constitutionality of a residency requirement). 
 266. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 228 (1999) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 267. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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thousands, if not millions, of potential circulators available statewide who 
would be able to assist any plaintiff in circulating petitions.268 
As noted by the Eighth Circuit, nonresidents who have a political interest 
in candidates and initiative questions in other states still have many effective 
ways to assert their views and influence the process.269  The only limit placed 
on their speech by these restrictions is that nonresidents cannot physically 
collect the required signatures.270  Such a requirement, although certainly 
burdensome for petition circulators, does not constitute a “severe” restriction 
meriting strict scrutiny. 
Because a residency requirement would not impose a severe restriction on 
political speech, a lesser form of scrutiny is merited.271  Under either the 
“intermediate” form of “exacting” scrutiny or a rational basis review, such a 
restriction is sustained by the state’s regulatory interest.272 
As the Eighth Circuit observed in Jaeger, a residency requirement is 
tailored to multiple state interests.273  And, as mentioned previously, a state-
residency requirement is clearly tied to the state’s interest in protecting 
integrity in the electoral process and ensuring that petition circulators are able 
to answer to state subpoena power.274  Even if there are technically other 
options that are more “narrowly tailored” to that interest, the alternatives 
posited by the majority-view circuits would be significantly more difficult 
for the states to administer. 
Furthermore, while signing a petition does not necessarily constitute an 
endorsement of a candidate or initiative question,275 collecting signatures on 
behalf of that candidate or initiative certainly does.  By requiring 
circulators—who use their time and energy to secure a place on the ballot for 
an initiative or candidate—to be residents of the state with an investment in 
the community, this provision allows a state to effectively ensure that 
candidates have enthusiasm and support at the state level. 
Additionally, residency requirements significantly advance the state’s 
interest in local administration of its own elections.  Allowing outside 
influences to gather signatures would invariably tip the scales in favor of 
candidates and ballot issues that are supported by well-funded national 
interests outside the state.276  Opening up the petitioning process to all U.S. 
citizens could allow these interests to ship batches of circulators into states 
and essentially allow money, rather than the people of a state, to dictate who 
is on the ballot. 
Finally, the Supreme Court indicated in American Constitutional Law 
Foundation that it viewed a residency requirement to be a more tailored (and 
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thus more constitutionally acceptable) approach for asserting a state interest 
than the Colorado registration requirement it ultimately struck down.277  
These statements indicate the Court’s views on the constitutionality of 
residency requirements and should provide some direction to lower courts on 
how to properly frame the issue.  While the Eighth and Second Circuits 
incorporated these statements into their opinions on this question, the 
majority-view circuits have given these statements little to no weight.278  
These statements should certainly not be the definitive element in analyzing 
the constitutionality of such restrictions, but lower courts would be remiss to 
ignore these indications from the Supreme Court. 
It is possible that a state-residency requirement could be held 
unconstitutional in certain contexts even under this individualized balancing 
approach.279  Indeed, the aim of this new approach is to allow for an ad hoc 
determination of a statute’s constitutionality based on the individual 
circumstances and factors at play in a given state.  The differences across 
state lines “make[] it difficult to rely heavily on precedent in evaluating such 
restrictions, because there is great variance among the states’ schemes.”280  
As a general rule, however, a mere state-residency requirement for petition 
circulators does not pose the logistical hurdles and limitations on interactive 
political speech in the way that even other common restrictions might. 
Given the history of states arbitrarily restricting who is eligible to 
participate in their electoral process and the recent efforts by several states to 
suppress votes, many advocates will find the argument for allowing states to 
limit circulators to state residents to be counterintuitive.281  Limiting 
circulators to state residents, however, helps states to protect, among other 
things, important election integrity interests while minimizing the potential 
harm to First Amendment rights.  A state-residency requirement does not 
constitute a severe burden on core political speech and may also serve as a 
bulwark against well-moneyed interests further corrupting the electoral 
process at the state level.  From a legal, historical, and policy perspective, the 
Eighth Circuit’s application of American Constitutional Law Foundation to 
state-residency requirements merits a more thorough examination before 
being cast aside in favor of the more popular view. 
 
 277. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 211 (1999). 
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690. 
 280. Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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2a9f2d808496_story.html [https://perma.cc/G8PV-9ARR].  
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2.  “Voter Eligibility” Requirements:  
An Unconstitutional Burden on Political Speech 
An individualized balancing approach draws attention to another important 
distinction that courts have so far overlooked—the difference between 
residency and voter eligibility requirements.282  While mostly treated as 
indistinguishable by the majority-view circuits via the same broad legal 
analysis, the two types of restrictions present significant differences in the 
burdens and state interests advanced.  Given the long history of states 
restricting who is “voter eligible” based on race, this distinction should not 
go unnoticed.283 
While no longer the overt disqualifications of the Jim Crow era, the legacy 
of states restricting who is “voter eligible” on the basis of race persists, with 
many states requiring that individuals with felony convictions lose their 
status as eligible voters.284  In the years since American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, both the legal profession and the general public have grown 
increasingly aware of the racial disparities in American prison populations 
and the inherent racial bias in the criminal justice system, with some 
acknowledging the modern American penal system as an extension of 
slavery.285 
Concurrently, and perhaps relatedly, societal attitudes about recreational 
drug use and drug addiction have changed dramatically since 1999.286  It is 
not inconceivable, therefore, that a person with a felony drug conviction 
might wish to circulate petitions for a candidate who pledges to fight the 
opioid epidemic or for a ballot initiative to legalize recreational marijuana at 
the state level.287  In this context, such a person might have standing to 
challenge a voter eligibility requirement as unconstitutional and could show 
a severe burden on core political speech that reduces the number of voices 
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eligible to circulate petitions statewide under the American Constitutional 
Law Foundation framework in a way that a mere residency requirement 
would not.288 
If an individual could demonstrate such a burden, this type of restriction 
may actually present a situation that merits strict scrutiny.289  Throughout the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, strict scrutiny has been applied 
almost exclusively in cases involving racial discrimination.290  A state would 
be unable to demonstrate that a voter eligibility requirement would be 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to its asserted interests, especially because a 
residency requirement would achieve the exact same objectives without this 
discriminatory targeting of former felons.  While residency requirements are 
a justifiable imposition on core political speech in twenty-first century 
America, it is apparent from examining the context of eligibility requirements 
that they constitute an undue, and potentially discriminatory, burden on 
speech against a specific class of potential circulators. 
C.  Escaping the Coming Avalanche by “Skiing to the Bottom” 
of the Slippery Slope:  Revisiting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
Fear of the “Sphinx-Like Silence” 
In suggesting this return to a more individualized balancing approach, it is 
important to mention that Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted many of these 
issues in his scathing American Constitutional Law Foundation dissent.291  
The majority-view circuits’ broad application of the American Constitutional 
Law Foundation test, which holds that any restriction reducing the number 
of messengers constitutes a severe burden on political speech292 and is thus 
subject to strict scrutiny, now threatens to consume even the most reasonable 
restrictions on petition circulation. 
To prevent the majority line of circuit cases from completely swallowing 
the states’ ability to pass legitimate ballot-access restrictions, courts should 
draw a firm distinction between what is constitutionally permissible and what 
is not.  It is apparent that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s “slippery slope” 
prediction is no longer a mere “familiar parade of dreadfuls”293 but has 
materialized in the years since American Constitutional Law Foundation.294 
Since 2001, all circuits considering cases on this issue have struck down 
eligibility and residency requirements.295  This has resulted from a broad 
understanding of the American Constitutional Law Foundation/Grant view 
of a “severe burden” and a resulting overuse of strict scrutiny. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted the American Constitutional Law 
Foundation majority’s logic would lead to courts finding restrictions on 
“children and foreigners” circulating petitions to be unconstitutional.296  
While the American Constitutional Law Foundation majority dismissed the 
Chief Justice’s “unfounded”297 alarmism and accused him of “skiing to the 
bottom” of the slippery slope, the majority-view circuits’ broad application 
of the American Constitutional Law Foundation test suggests that this fear is 
no longer farfetched.  The majority-view circuits have found that any 
restriction that reduces the number of messengers, in the abstract, is subject 
to strict scrutiny, where the state’s burden is “well-nigh insurmountable.”298  
The next logical step for these courts would be to eliminate “reasonable” 
restrictions such as age and U.S. citizenship requirements for petition 
circulators, as both inarguably greatly reduce the number of messengers able 
to carry petitions under the majority-view circuits’ broad interpretation.299  
Restrictions on age and citizenship are especially ripe to be overturned; 
foreign nationals and minors have been found to have equal rights to political 
speech and expression under the First Amendment.300 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s American Constitutional Law Foundation 
dissent was also the first to note the important difference between residency 
and eligibility requirements,301 although his opinion is certainly in keeping 
with his reputation of issuing “a somber drumbeat of rejections of the claims 
of blacks, women, workers and criminal defendants.”302  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that eligibility restrictions were the preferable state policy 
because they would keep felons and drug dealers from circulating petitions 
in communities.303  Although framed in the context of his trademark 
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contempt for drug dealers and convicted felons,304 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
well-reasoned analysis of the distinction between these two types of 
circulator restrictions provides twenty-first century courts and scholars with 
the best place to draw the constitutional line.  By heeding the Chief Justice’s 
legal reasoning and predictions, courts can prevent reasonable ballot-access 
restrictions from being consumed in the avalanche about to overtake the 
slippery slope. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Constitutional Law 
Foundation further complicated an inconsistent and confusing area of the 
law.  The majority of circuit courts hearing challenges to residency and voter 
eligibility requirements under this framework have understandably searched 
for clarity where none exists, which has resulted in their striking down state-
residency and voter eligibility requirements under the First Amendment.  The 
Eighth Circuit, by contrast, has better understood the nuances and individual 
balancing provisions of American Constitutional Law Foundation.  The 
Court’s use of the flexible and ambiguous “exacting” scrutiny standard in 
Grant, seemingly affirmed and applied again in American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, indicates that the Court favored greater flexibility in weighing 
the state’s interests against the infringement on individual First Amendment 
rights.  For a number of historical and policy reasons, as well as the potential 
for the majority-view circuit decisions to consume even the most reasonable 
ballot-access laws, a state-residency requirement represents the logical 
constitutional line to draw in balancing these two competing interests. 
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